implementation has produced many of the intended benefits but is also producing strain from high operations tempo and cultural differences. These strains have contributed to negative consequences to FTF unit members that threaten the strategic vision. However, there exists a side to FTF that few outside of the participating units are aware of. Despite the sanctioned success stories, the problematic growing pains of this large transformational effort are underemphasized. For instance, the more controversial active associate and integrated constructs (to be discussed later) produced intense cultural clashes that needed unusual workarounds to produce the noted success stories. FTF unit commanders felt pressure to make the new construct work, and often passed their accomplishments up the chain of command for recognition while choosing to work the harsh realities of forced integration internally, if choosing to work on them at all. Therefore, the barriers to effective implementation were being under-reported, which took away the means to address those barriers. The result is a far different and dissenting view of FTF progress by the unit subordinates-those people who were living the vision.
The pressures of perceived forced integration with the other component plus the continuing unusually high operational tempo are adversely affecting morale and cohesion. The troops largely heard "Make it work!" while any accompanying rationale or additional guidance was not provided. Unit members, by and large, perceive that senior leadership does not fully understand the realities accompanying FTF implementation.
FTF is a long term transformational effort that has the service and A process by which the military achieves and maintains advantage through changes in operational concepts, organization, and/or technologies that significantly improve its warfighting capabilities or ability to meet the demands of a changing security environment.
rationale, the flight plan specifically states:
The Air Force will develop options to leverage all capabilities and expand Associate Unit programs and "Blended Wing" initiatives. Fortunately, these beliefs and bias' are eroding as the RC increases its visibility on the forefront of the mission, the draft becomes a distant memory, and the senior offenders retire.
Air Reserve Component
The Air Reserve component includes the Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) and the Air National Guard (ANG). Authorized end strength for the ANG is 106 ,678 8 and 74,000 for the AFRC. 9 The key concept of the RC is "citizen airman." By and large, duty in the RC is voluntary and co-exists with a civilian career. This principle of volunteerism 10 means the member has a choice to participate. This may be the greatest weakness since volunteerism can only be estimated and not definitively scheduled. Members of the ARC typically have been in the same unit and often the same job for years. This often pays off with an unmatched experience level, which is also the components greatest strength.
Close association over long periods tends to produce a level of familiarity within ARC units that some active members find offensive. Many ARC members are former active personnel.
For various personal reasons, they chose to leave active duty to pursue other interests while still serving the country from a system more to their liking.
Unlike active members who all serve in one status, members serving in either the Reserve or Guard participate in one of the following four statuses:
• Traditional Reserve (TR-Reserve) or Drilling Status Guardsman (DSG-Guard)
These "citizen airmen" are members of the selected reserve and popularly known as "weekend warriors." They function as the heart of the ARC. Although these volunteers are only committed to one weekend a month and two weeks a year, the global commitments since the end of the Cold War add pressure to participate much more. TR/DSGs must struggle to balance their time between civilian career, family, and military affiliation. This juggling of commitments is becoming more stressful as pressure to participate in the military remains intense. Civilian employers, especially small companies, tend to lose out when their workers are unavailable due to military duty. Although sympathetic to the cause at first, many civilian employers are now finding TR/DSG employees a burden.
• Air Reserve Technician (ART)
Air reserve technicians, commonly referred to as ARTs, are a nucleus of managers, planners, and trainers who manage the day-to-day operations of an ARC unit. They provide management continuity, equipment maintenance, and training support to help keep their units combat ready.
ARTs carry dual status, working as full-time civil service employees for the Air Force and as TR/DSG military members. They serve as TR members at the same units where they work as civilians and perform the same job. As civilians, ARTs provide full-time support throughout the month for their units. As military members, ARTs participate with other reservists on weekends and annual active-duty tours and are mobilized with the unit.
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• Active Guard Reserve (AGR)
AGR members are similar to regular active duty personnel. They are on duty "24/7", earn the same pay, and accrue the same benefits. The only major difference is that they are administratively and operationally assigned to either the Guard or Reserve, as their affiliation mandates. AGRs serve on limited tours of active duty, usually at headquarters staff level or in other special assignments. Their job is to bring Reserve or Guard expertise to the planning and decision-making processes at senior levels within the Air Force and other services.
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• Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA)
IMAs are Reservists who are assigned to active-duty units to do jobs that are essential in wartime but do not require full-time manning during times of peace. They report for duty a minimum of one day a month and 12 additional annual training days a year.
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The ARC is subject to additional considerations that must be analyzed for their effects on potential FTF units:
• Volunteerism A bedrock principle of FTF is to use the ARC as a daily partner in today's stressing operations tempo. The problem with this is that the ARC was designed and structured to be a Cold War backup force and is manned accordingly. Gone are the days of "one weekend a month, two weeks a year." Today's TR/DSG force is being "asked" to give more and more of their time to military duty. Time given to the military takes away from time expected by their civilian employers and family. Ways to increase volunteerism are being explored but may not be achievable. Despite this quandary, volunteerism is the preferred way to fulfill requirements for the Global War on Terrorism.
14 What all of this means is the ARC is being relied upon by the combatant commander, but TR/DSG members have the choice to participate. Danger lurks here, and the important aspect of volunteerism must be strongly considered when building FTF units with high operations tempo.
• Mobilization
Filling missions with volunteers is important so that involuntary service through mobilization can be avoided. If the ARC mission cannot be completed with volunteers, the President can mobilize the force to active duty status. This tool is used sparingly, as the repercussions are enormous. Civilian employers face hardship while their employees are not available to work. Mobilized personnel often experience pay cuts and other hardships not typical of part-time participation. On a positive note, even after mobilization authority is available, volunteers may be used to decrease the number of airman mobilized.
• Recruiting and Retention
Recruiting and retention are now presenting challenges to the ARC. The pool of active duty separatees continues to shrink due to force reductions over the last decade, and the competition for these members has become even keener. The active duty is intensifying its efforts in retention, and the Air National Guard and Reserves are competing for these assets as well. Additionally, the current high operations tempo and a perceived likelihood of mobilization and deployment are being routinely cited as significant reasons why separating members are declining to choose continuing military service in the ARC. These issues further contribute to the civilian sector's ability to attract these members away from military service. One consequence of the reduced success in attracting separating members from active duty is the need to make up this difference through attracting non-prior service (NPS) members.
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Increasing NPS members, however, erodes the high experience base the ARC is known for.
To conclude, the ARC is organized to be effective in a different era--the Cold War.
Volunteerism is meeting the combatant commander's requirements, but this may be difficult to maintain. Until significant ARC restructuring occurs, FTF strategy and decision makers should weigh these three considerations carefully.
FTF Constructs
The Air Force Directorate of Total Force Integration (AF/A8F) serves as the lead agency to build organizational constructs that will improve combat capability by better serving Active By doing this we can leverage the tremendous experience levels we have in the Guard and Reserve, as well as provide the ability to utilize the active duty airmen to sustain increasing levels of deployment necessitated by our expeditionary role.
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This model is the opposite of the classic associate. This means that the active duty will move to Guard and Reserve locations, not just the other way around. In this construct, the ARC has responsibility for weapon system or systems, which it shares with one or more AC units.
Both components retain separate organizational structures and chains of command. 18 In addition to exposing AC personnel to higher experienced ARC members, the AC also has better "access to iron." The AC can fly ARC airplanes (increase utilization rate) when ARC members are unavailable.
The 919th Special Operations at Duke Field, Florida flies the MC-130E Combat Talon I aircraft under an active associate arrangement. Experience here has shown the quote above to be overly optimistic. The MC-130E is a low density high demand asset (LDHD) and "tip of the spear" asset in the Global War on Terror. This is precisely the type of FTF situation to avoid.
Recall the three ARC characteristics discussed earlier. Immediately after 9/11 the unit was mobilized for two years. Many ARC units were mobilized during the initial post 9/11 thrust.
Mobilization happened because the likelihood of meeting those initial requirements through volunteerism was negligible. The problems continued after the mobilization period ended and the reservists went back to their civilian careers and volunteerism waned for a while. Since the Talon I mission did not decrease at all, despite the ended mobilization, the active piece of this association was forced to continue performing the mission it did not technically own. This caused resentment between both components at the unit level.
The Talon I is scheduled for retirement in 2010. As the Reserves look for a follow-on mission, the Air Force Special Operations Command has shown no desire to enter another active associate agreement in any of its LDHD platforms.
Active associations are useful for newer active troops to learn from their more experienced ARC brethren. However, potential FTF LDHD active associate constructs should generate red flags and wailing sirens to the strategist.
Air Reserve Component (ARC) Associate
The ARC associate unit is the combination of both AFRC and ANG units with one designated with the responsibility for the weapon system or systems, which is shared by all.
Each unit retains separate organizational structures and chains of command. 
Integrated Associate
This model is similar to the classic associate however all members belong to a single unit and administrative support and control is provided by the respective component through detachments. 22 The 116 ACW found the integrated approach to be militarily unworkable. It needed a definitive command and control structure for each of its components to properly function as a military unit. The unit partially solved this issue by retaining respective administrative control.
More contentious issues of rotating commanders between Guard and active, along with ensuring each is legally able to command the other, are being worked.
Forced integration into difficult organizational constructs generally brings a negative reaction from members. FTF strategists must consider minimizing growing pains to unit members--even if this means sacrificing potential FTF gains.
FTF Test Initiatives
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FTF is venturing into unknown territory by testing innovative organizational constructs to synergize the strengths of active duty and citizen airmen. These extensive initiatives demonstrate top leadership support to long term FTF. The more prominent of these initiatives are described below.
• The good news is that the professionals at AF/A8F are evolving and working hard to manage the initiative. As is the case with all things, the responsibility for success falls with leadership. The following FTF-bolstering strategies will better enable leadership to make sure the "right unit" is being created at the "right place."
Understand the ARC Both active and air reserve components have significant strengths and weaknesses that must be better understood by FTF strategists. Some well-intended FTF constructs that are in place now have proven to be too culturally radical--too upsetting to the members--to realize intended efficiencies. It is time to include the ARC in all levels of developmental education.
Since the ARC is an essential mission accomplishment tool, it is essential for leaders at all levels to be familiar with this tool before using it! This recommendation goes beyond just the Air Force, as the operating environment today is undeniably joint in nature. The active personnel in all services need to understand more about their reserve components than what they bring to the fight. They also need to know what makes the reserve components culturally different.
Education will then enable the strategic leader to examine the puzzle pieces as outlined in this paper and figure out the best ways to make them fit together. First, a definition of the word
Reserve:
1. To keep back, as for future use or for a special purpose.
2. To set or cause to be set apart for a particular person or use. 25 Our current ARC was originally conceptualized with these two definitions in mind. Many of its members today still hold on to that paradigm. Members choose to serve in either component for personal reasons. Those reasons usually include not wanting to be a member of the other one! Therefore, being forced to work with the other on a routine basis may result in resentment that detracts from the overall vision. Today's expectation to partner different components can entail more commitment and effort than the member intends to give.
FTF strategists must be educated on the concept of "citizen airman" before deciding on constructs. The elements of volunteerism, mobilization, and recruiting and retention must be consciously and clearly understood. Strategists must also understand the importance of cultural identity on potential associations. Maintaining cultural identity should be a paramount consideration when constructing a FTF unit. Any new idea must have buy-in from those who must use or live under it in order for it to be a success. If people at any level do not see the merits of a proposal, they may undermine the effort in a variety of ways. There has been a perception among unit members that senior leadership in some cases simply mandated success of FTF--something that is impossible to do.
Take the case of the 116 ACW integrated wing initiative:
The two wings joined with essentially no direction other than, "Make it happen and don't fail." 26 That is not a flattering assessment of how the implementation proceeded. The wing generated a lot of great press for getting the job done. Much of this was attributed to the integration, but many wing members have a different take about what earned the hearty praise.
It came down to pride--the unit members would not let the mission fail despite the ongoing organizational experimentation. "Pushing a wheelbarrow upside down" will get the job done but not by the best means.
process and reports honest feedback. It is leadership's job to continually translate strategic goals to subordinates in a manner the subordinates understand. This involves explaining "why" things are happening. The days of blind followers are gone in today's Air Force. Our professional and highly skilled cadre must understand why. If they do, the chances are better that they will support the cause. Conversely, leadership must transmit subordinate feedback back up to the senior level so appropriate adjustments can be made. Sometimes there is bad news! The only way to fix something major is to let people know there is something wrong.
Transformational leadership involves continual mediation and marketing so both superior and subordinate understand the dynamics of what is trying to happen. 
